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Constitutional Pluralism Revisited 
 
Neil Walker  
 
 
1.  The Claim of Constitutional Pluralism 
Like most theories that have enjoyed a modicum of popularity, constitutional pluralism 
– particularly as applied to the EU – has also attracted a deal of scepticism. Briefly 
stated, constitutional pluralism (CP) in its original European context1 maintains that: 
 (1) the overall complex2 of law pertaining to the EU embraces multiple sites (i.e., the 
supranational site of the EU and the national sites of each of its 28 member states), 
each with its own claim to constitutional authority; 
2) there is, in fact, no dominant understanding of this complex that holds across these 
multiple sites, according to which the claims to constitutional authority associated with 
each site would be ordered within a hierarchy or otherwise reconciled and resolved by 
reference to a single meta-authoritative standard; rather, each site is associated with 
                                                        
1 For discussion of constitutional pluralism beyond the European context, see e.g. M. Avbelj and 
J.Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012); N. 
Krisch Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010); N. 
Walker Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) ch.3. 
2  I use the term ‘complex’ advisedly, as a neutral, pre-theoretical description of something that is 
made up of different elements linked in a close or complicated way.  Other more familiar terms to 
account for the holistic quality of law, such as ‘system’ or ‘order’ are avoided at this initial stage as 
they already carry with them, at least in some usages, particular understandings of the nature of the 
connections between the parts of the complex that it is precisely the point of constitutional pluralism 
to elucidate and evaluate. As will become clear in the text, in developing the theory of constitutional 
pluralism I favour ‘system’ to describe the institutionally ‘thick’ and normatively comprehensive and 
self-referential frameworks of national and supranational law, and treat ‘order’ as extending to any 
coherent normative formation, including the looser forms of coherence that might emerge from a 
repetitive pattern of interaction between different legal systems.   In this I follow K. Culver and M. 
Guidice, ‘Not a system but an order: An inter-Institutional View of European union Law’ in J. Dickson 
and P. Elefthereadis (eds) Philosophical Foundations of European union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 54.  
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a plausible claim to ultimate constitutional authority that stands independently of the 
other claims 
 (3) In order to sustain the overall complex in a constitutionally optimal fashion, each 
site ought to acknowledge and somehow accommodate the claims of the others as 
independent sites of constitutional authority – thereby ensuring the continuing absence 
of a single dominant authoritative framework   
Stated in these three propositions, CP differs from and has been challenged by 
what may be termed particularist, holist and federalist conceptions of EU law. 
Subscribers to those other conceptions claim that CP is unsatisfactory in one or more 
of a number of respects. In terms of the first and second propositions set out above, CP 
may offer a false or inadequate account of the constitutional framework of the EU. Or, 
contrary to the claim in the third proposition set out above, it may have normatively 
undesirable implications. More generally, CP may be regarded as indistinct or as only 
trivially distinct from one of the other conceptions, or as offering an inferior version of 
another conception, and so as supplying a redundant perspective, or worse, a 
perspective that distorts or distracts from a similar but superior perspective. 
The value of CP, then, depends, in the first instance, on how well it can answer 
these objections. Is CP’s depiction of the EU constitutional arena compelling, or at least 
tenable (the descriptive/explanatory claim)? To the extent that it is tenable, does it paint 
an attractive picture of a European future, or at least one that is less unattractive than 
other perspectives, bearing in mind that what counts as attractive in this context is both 
contestable and complex (the normative claim)?  And if it does pass these two tests, 
does it actually constitute an original position, or does it merely borrow the clothes of 
other positions better suited to its purposes (the distinctiveness claim)? 
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But even if these objections can be overcome and the alternative claims of the 
rival theories of the legal character of European integration rebutted, this would not 
amount to a full vindication of the explanatory appropriateness or normative value of 
CP.  The shortcomings of rival theories are not reason enough to endorse CP. I do 
nevertheless want to insist upon this first step, and so begin by making the argument 
that CP does not fail on account of any superiority demonstrated or critique offered by 
these rivals.  CP’s broader challenge, however, and also its broader prospects, derives 
from a more general difficulty associated with the legal and political conceptualisation 
of the European Union. In a nutshell, for reasons developed below, it is difficult - and 
as the European supranational experiment enters a turbulent seventh decade it becomes 
ever more difficult - to imagine the EU as a legitimate legal and political construction 
other than by invoking the structures and values of constitutionalism; that, indeed, is 
why I use the language of ‘constitutionally optimal’ to describe the normative ambition 
of CP. Yet those constitutional structures and values fit awkwardly with the EU’s 
unprecedented non-state form. The idea of constitutional pluralism captures this sense 
of awkward indispensability – of an approach that seems as unfamiliar, even 
incongruous, as it does unavoidable. As such, or so I shall claim, CP supplies a key if 
testing point of departure for thinking through the best terms and future promise of the 
European constellation. 
2. Locating Constitutional Pluralism 
Before developing these lines of argument, however, let me make three additional 
preliminary remarks with a view to locating CP more precisely within the diverse and 
expansive landscape of EU theory and praxis. 
First, as we shall see, the type and balance of critique offered by CP’s various 
rivals differs. Particularism tends to treat CP as descriptively and explanatorily 
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underspecified or banal, as normatively inconsequential and as only trivially 
distinctive; or, if normatively consequential and significantly distinctive, as 
unattractively so. Holism, too, treats CP as normatively unattractive, but also as 
descriptively or explanatorily false or inadequate. Only federalism would accept the 
significance of CP’s descriptive and explanatory claim, and share certain aspects of its 
normative orientation. In elaborating its arguments along somewhat similar lines to CP, 
federalism is also more explicitly concerned than the other approaches with the deeper 
political foundations of the EU. But from this more rounded perspective, federalism 
offers itself as a better version of the distinctive thesis that CP attempts to articulate.  
The different angles of critique offered by these various positions are reflected 
in our order of argument. We deal first with the opposition between constitutional 
pluralism and constitutional particularism and between constitutional pluralism and 
constitutional holism. Only then do we turn to the continuities or otherwise in the 
relationship between constitutional pluralism and federalism. 
Secondly, and crucially, as the suggestion of continuity between federalism and 
pluralism implies, the case for CP can only hope to prevail – can only offer something 
that is of descriptive and explanatory value, normatively defensible and interestingly 
distinctive - if it is seen as an argument that reaches beneath the legal topsoil to deeper 
political roots. That is to say, building on my previous work I want to claim that CP 
cannot simply concern a particular conception of the nature of the legal domain, but 
must also address the political dynamics and infrastructure which underpin the legal 
domain; and so ultimately CP should be considered as much a matter of political theory 
as of legal theory.3 And it is precisely because constitutional thought and praxis is 
                                                        
3  See my ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 317-359; see also M. Loughlin, 
‘Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron’ (2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism 9-30. 19-21. 
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capable of engaging with the deeper seam of political thought and praxis that it is 
important to understand our approach as one not merely of legal pluralism but of 
constitutional pluralism.4  
My case rests on the role that constitutional ideas, talk and practice play in the 
generation and sustenance of the polity, whether national or otherwise. The emergence 
and intensification of constitutional discourse at any particular site – a process whose 
maturity is often marked by the promulgation of a written Constitution but need not be 
– has closely interconnected expressive, epistemic and design functions. As I have 
argued elsewhere, a constitution-building process or project   supplies  ‘both trace and 
catalyst’5 of political community.  It is an important trace of political community in that 
the preparedness of the provisional or putative members of a collective entity to 
consider that collective entity in an overtly constitutional register is already a sign and 
expression, however modest, of the commitment to put things in common whose terms 
they seek to elaborate through a collective scheme. And the elaboration of that scheme 
is also a catalyst of political community; it is so in two senses, referring, respectively, 
to the construction of the knowing collective subject and the specification of the means 
and object of political community. On the one hand, the process of elaboration and 
ongoing adjustment of the scheme of collective action involves the stipulation of a 
reference point and procedure of collective agency, and so the identification of a 
collective subject over time. On the other, the substance of the scheme thus elaborated 
provides the normative guidance and institutional vehicle to articulate and pursue that 
common commitment as a continuous project of collective action.                                                           
4  On the relationship between constitutional pluralism and the broader category of legal pluralism, 
with its roots both in studies of law and imperial relations and in a more general sociology of co-
existing or overlapping normative orders, see e.g.  R. Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2009) 5 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 243; N. Walker, above n1, 114-118. 
5 N. Walker, ‘The Place of European Law’ in G. De Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The Worlds of 
European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) 57-105, 104. 
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Granted, a first impression of much of the literature under the banner of 
constitutional pluralism suggests a more restricted focus of attention. Much of its 
emphasis has been on a limited set of legal tests and contests, and, more specifically, 
on courts and on the respective judicial authority of the Court of Justice and of the apex 
courts of the member states. That standard version of CP I will not reproduce here 
except in the broadest of brush-strokes.6 It begins by contrasting the perspective of the 
Court of Justice, which, through the early development of doctrines of direct effect, 
primacy, pre-emption, fundamental rights etc., asserted its originality and finality of 
jurisdiction – invoking the autonomous authority of the Treaty of Rome and its 
successors - in matters of EU law, with that of the national courts, for whom the validity 
of EU law remained grounded in national constitutional authority. And while European 
clauses in national constitutions and other doctrines of national constitutional law 
readily accept the priority of EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice in the normal 
case, national courts, with the German Constitutional Court in the vanguard, will also 
more or less explicitly seek to reserve the final authority of the national constitution for 
certain exceptional cases and in accordance with certain longstop considerations. In 
particular, national constitutional courts hold the authority of the Court of Justice and 
the EU legal order to be conditional upon respect for national constitutional rights, for 
the limits of the (however extensive) competences conferred upon European 
institutions in the Treaties, and, increasingly, for certain unalterable core provisions or 
other integral features of the constitution that are deemed indispensable to the 
                                                        
6  See, in particular, the pioneering work of Neil MacCormick; ’Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 
MLR 1-18; Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: OUP, 1999), See also the influential work by Miguel 
Maduro, Mattias Kumm and  Daniel Halberstam.  A good collection, containing pieces by all these and 
others, is M. Avbelj and J. Komarek (eds) above n1. 
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sustenance of national constitutional identity and to the standing of the state as a self-
governing polity.7   
 The spotlight on courts is understandable for a number of reasons. It offers a 
window on the broader tensions and dilemmas of the EU, identifies a point of 
movement in an often blocked political system, and provides a key institutional 
reference for a supranational order that has always defined itself in a strongly legal 
register. Yet there is also a downside. Understood as a court-centred enterprise CP, as 
we will see, is often taken to task for its supposedly overblown claims - for exaggerating 
either the success or the importance of its contribution.  On the one hand, it can be 
criticized for conceding, or worse, celebrating fluidity, uncertainty, unprincipled 
concession, even conflict, at the high judicial level.8 On the other hand, it can also be 
criticized for overstating the contribution made by these specifically judicial answers 
(such as they are) to deep questions of constitutional fundamentals in resolving the 
EU’s problems of legitimacy.9  
If either of these emphases is viewed as the crux of CP, then it surely deserves 
such criticism. But if CP’s point of departure, in line with the broader tradition of 
constitutional thought, is the generative forces of political community, its central focus 
will instead be upon   the deeper structural condition of the EU as a divided power 
system. It follows that attempts to find resolution at the judicial level comprise merely 
one response – immediate and unavoidable, yet also merely reactive and provisional - 
                                                        
7  For a thorough overview, see J Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist 
Movement’ (2008) 14 ELJ 389-422. For an overview of recent developments, with particular reference 
to decisions arising out of the EU’s response to financial crisis, see F. Fabbrini (ed), ‘The European 
Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, and the Supremacy of EU Law’ Special Issue (2016) 23 
Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 1. 
8  See e.g. Cruz, n7 above; D. Kelemen, ‘On the unsustainability of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2016) 23 
MJ 136-150; C. Tinnermans, ‘The Magic World of Constitutional Pluralism’  (2014) 10  European 
Constitutional Law Review  349-58 
9  See e.g. Loughlin, above n3. ; K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge; CUP, 2015) 38-44. 
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to tensions inherent in that deeper structural condition, and CP should instead be judged 
in terms of the overall treatment of that deeper trait that is possible within a 
constitutional frame of reference. And that is why, in turn, the most productive 
conversation does not ultimately take place between CP and particularism or holism, 
but between pluralism and federalism, with its deeper foundations in political 
institutions and theory. 
Locating the relevance of CP, however, is not just a matter of finding the right 
level of theoretical inquiry and practical leverage. In addition - we should note as a final 
preliminary point - it requires consideration of the appropriateness or otherwise of the 
theory and practice of CP to changing historical circumstances. The ideas associated 
with CP rose to prominence in the 1990s and early 2000s in reaction to the significant 
strengthening of the supranational centre in the wake of the Single European Act and 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, and so in a very different political climate than 
that which attends the post-Constitutional Convention, post-Lisbon, post-Euro-crisis 
EU. Even if CP were capable of speaking in explanatorily and normatively appropriate 
terms to the legal and political environment of the EU during that earlier period, can it 
still do so today? That is far from evident. There has always been an aspect of CP 
thought and practice that suggests its message is a contingent one, more or less relevant 
to particular circumstances. Perhaps CP simply described and addressed the growing 
pains of a young and immature political structure, or was a passing phase suited to a 
(relatively) benignly progressive period in the EU’s history.10 Or, perhaps, if we view 
the EU’s life cycle in more abbreviated terms, but also in a gloomier light, the 
emergence of CP indicates the beginnings of degeneration rather than a phase of 
growth, and its continuing manifestation is evidence not of the health of the Euro-polity 
                                                        
10 See e.g., Kelemen, above n8. 
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but of critical illness, or even the onset of senility.  Yet I want to argue that the value 
of CP, such as it is, should be understood in none of these transient terms. Rather, it 
should be regarded as a resilient feature of the deep political culture and practice of the 
EU, and, indeed, one of growing significance. Only as such can we appreciate its 
distinctive explanatory and normative credentials.  
 
2. Beyond Particularism and Holism 
(a) particularism 
The particularist approach  - a term I now11 prefer to the more frequently used but here 
confusing ‘monism’12 - holds that there is no explanatory or normative dividend to be 
gained from going beyond either the national constitutional perspective or the EU 
constitutional perspective, or, indeed, beyond a position that entertains both of these 
perspectives discretely conceived, in seeking to come to terms with the EU as a legal 
complex.  We can imagine three versions of the particularist approach, which in turn 
flow from two different stances towards the particularity of legal systems. These 
stances are in turn situated or embedded, and detached.  
The situated or embedded stance involves the assumption and endorsement of 
                                                        
11 In earlier writings, I used the term ‘monism’. See e.g., Walker, above n3. 
12   In philosophical terms, which are the terms with which we are here concerned, monism can refer 
to any position that claims an understanding of a variety of things from a singular perspective or in 
accordance with a singular reality or substance. And in these terms, what I am here calling 
particularism is indeed a form of monism. Yet as a term of art in international law doctrine and 
scholarship, monism is used in a quite different sense.  Here it   represents a view that treats 
international law (which includes EU law, at least as originally conceived) as indivisible from domestic 
law, and so as applicable in domestic law without the need for a domestic instrument of 
implementation. It does so in conceptual opposition to dualism, which treats international law 
(including EU law) as distinct from domestic law, and so as inapplicable in domestic law absent a 
domestic instrument of application. Yet the very choice whether to adopt a monist or dualist 
approach to international law lies with each domestic legal system as an aspect of its own singular 
(and , therefore, philosophically monist or particularist) view of the legal universe, and so both 
monism and dualism in international law are compatible with philosophical monism.  Hence the scope 
for confusion in using the term ‘monism’ at the broader philosophical level, and my preference for 
‘particularism’.  
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one particular perspective, either a state-centred constitutional perspective or an EU-
centred constitutional perspective, as the exclusive basis from which to make sense of 
the EU constitutional configuration.  Either the member states’ legal orders, with their 
comprehensiveness of jurisdictional reach, their original claim to sovereignty and their 
open-ended capacity to absorb other legal materials – including those of international 
law in general and the supranational law of the EU treaties in particular, can provide an 
exhaustive elaboration of the EU legal order on their own constitutional terms.13 Or the 
EU itself can supply an equally full constitutional account of the EU legal order. The 
EU’s competence may be Treaty-based, and to that extent textually and functionally 
circumscribed. Yet its judicial claim, anchored in the doctrines of primacy and direct 
effect, to control the terms and outer limits of that competence, together with its 
capacity, similar to that of the state, to absorb extraneous legal materials - in its case by 
reducing the norms and institutions of other (state) legal orders to its own terms and 
service (in particular, relying on state institutions for much of the execution and 
enforcement of its normative regime as well as for some of its basic legislative 
elaboration in the implementation of ‘directives’), allows it to understand and portray  
itself, like the state, as the maker and master of its own legal universe. 
 In this category of situated particularism, therefore, there is simply no need 
from a legal perspective to look beyond the open system either of the state-centred or 
the EU-centred position to make sense of the whole of the EU order. What, then, tends14 
to explain a choice of one over the other, is a matter of ideological preference rather 
than analytical refinement. The state-centred perspective is more likely to be aligned 
                                                        
13 On these typical features of a state legal system, see J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2009, 2nd ed.) 116-20. 
14  Although there is no necessary connection in this regard. See e.g., K. Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism 
in the EU (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 1-9. 
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with a position that understands the EU in ideological terms as a resiliently state-
derivative structure, while the EU-centred perspective is more likely to be aligned with 
a position that understands the EU in ideological terms as a structure with an 
autonomous state-transcending legitimacy, and so as a distinctly non-parochial version 
of particularism.15 
Yet the particularist position can also be detached from either of these particular 
forms of particularism, so to speak. It can simply involve equal recognition of the in-
principle normative exclusivity and closure of both state-centred and EU-centred 
conceptions. Rather than endorsing one over the other, the coherence of each on its own 
terms may be acknowledged, including the open-ended capacity of each to absorb the 
other in its own normative terms. On this detached view, what we are left with when 
confronting the EU legal configuration is quite unexceptional. It is merely a multiplicity 
of particular legal systems adjacently positioned, each claiming for its own purposes an 
exclusive and exhaustive jurisdiction even at the outer boundaries of it normative 
capacity - a feature of legal-institutional life with which, from the very diversity of 
sovereign statehood, the world has long been familiar.16  
We can now begin to see why and how both situated and detached versions of 
particularism would be critical of CP. The situated view, either state-centred or EU-
centred, could accuse CP of culpable fence-sitting – of failing to identify a dominant 
(descriptive-explanatory) constitutional narrative or to commit to the best (normative) 
such constitutional narrative to account for the EU. In so failing, CP may be seen from 
either situated perspective, whether state–centred or EU-centred, to provide 
                                                        
15  See e.g. Cruz, above n7. 
16 See e.g. P. Eleftheriadis, ‘Pluralism and Integrity’ (210) 23   Ratio Juris 365-89; N. Barber, ‘Legal 
Pluralism and the European Union (2006) 12 ELJ 306. 
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unnecessary succor to the other perspective.17 More generally, CP may be seen as 
gratuitously inviting the possibility of judicially focused normative conflict, uncertainty 
and irresolution between perspectives, either of which, according to their respective 
supporters, would be capable of avoiding any such conflict, uncertainty or irresolution 
within its own situated terms.  
The detached version of particularism, for its part, endorses one or other of the 
following critiques of CP. Either the specification of a diversity of constitutional orders 
situated in close jurisdictional proximity merely repeats an unremarkable institutional 
fact in a new setting, in which case CP’s claim is a trite assertion of plurality without 
any genuine insight into the kind of mutual recognition and accommodation that might 
instead make this case one of pluralism.  Or such novelty as it possesses is purchased 
at the price of normative incoherence, in that the only way in which a genuine pluralism 
becomes possible is through a process of ‘judicial double-overlap’ 18  by which 
uncertainty and attendant conflict over the final authority in EU law is internalized in 
either or both systems (national-constitutional and EU) - so raising the spectre of 
arbitrariness in judicial decision-making.  
In a nutshell, the particularist, whether situated or detached, criticizes CP for 
the inadequacy of its descriptive/explanatory account, in so doing presenting a scenario 
that encourages the unnecessary indulgence of constitutional conflict and uncertainty 
in the highest courts, as well as the elevation – perhaps even the willing self-elevation 
– of the judiciary to a position of undue institutional power within the EU legal 
                                                        
17 See e.g., Cruz, above n7, 414, criticizing CP’s acknowledgement of the reservations of national 
constitutional courts; and conversely, see P. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and 
the Nation-state (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 266, criticizing  CP’s recognition of the autonomous 
constitutional standing of EU law. 
18  Jaklic, above n14, at 197, discussing, inter alia, Eleftheriadis and Barber, above n16.  
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constellation. And in its turn, how CP responds to this tells us something of significance 
about its historical strengths and weaknesses and its perennial challenges 
In its favour, CP is on strong if narrow ground in claiming that, at the descriptive 
and explanatory level, the pattern of intersection and prospect of collision between legal 
orders that it contemplates is neither contrived nor unexceptional in the ways that its 
critics suggest. Granted, the particularist is correct to point to the in-principle 
completeness of vision of an ‘own’ legal-normative universe available from any and all 
particular legal systemic positions, regardless of the overlap in-practice of their 
jurisdictions. Yet it is not clear how we can fail to have regard to that very overlap-in-
practice. Situated particularists, much as they might wish it to be otherwise, cannot 
point to the uncontroversial dominance of their preferred situated perspective to pre-
empt or address the problem. Detached particularists cannot easily equate the marginal 
and largely inconsequential de facto overlap of jurisdictions elsewhere in the global 
landscape of self-contained legal-normative systems with the evidently consequential 
overlap of jurisdictions inscribed in the relationship between the EU and its member 
states. If we set the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice alongside that of national 
constitutional or supreme courts from Germany in the European centre, to Denmark in 
the North, Spain in the West, and Poland in the East, we can only conclude that the 
meaning of the EU legal order is capable of differing in ways that are of significance 
for its overall direction and scale of ambition depending upon whether one adopts an 
EU-centred perspective or any of many state-centred perspectives. That message is 
clear from various celebrated lines of cases, ranging from questions of the priority of 
general rights claims19 or, more recently, particular rights claims  in the implementation                                                         
19 As in the famous Solange judgments of the German Constitutional Court;  Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 2 CMLR 540; 
Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (BvR 2, 197/83; [1987] 3 CMLR 225 
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of the European Arrest Warrant20 and in criminal procedure more generally;21 to the 
acceptable terms of Accession of new member states;22 and thence, in a line of cases 
initiated in the context of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty23 and intensified in 
the wake of the sovereign debt crisis,  to the permissible limits of the encroachment of 
common policy areas, in particular common monetary and economic policy, on the 
democratic self-governing capacity of member states.24   
To be sure, significance remains a matter of weight rather than frequency. Just 
because the national and EU legal orders are so tightly and densely interlocked in 
comparison to the normal cases of national-national or national-international legal 
systemic relations, and just because the points of judicial contestation are often so vital 
to the self-understanding of each, the comparative rarity of such occurrences cannot 
obscure their importance.  Against that backdrop, absent any objective basis to choose 
between either of the situated particularisms, detached particularism is also deficient in 
failing to show how the theoretical capacity of both state-centred and EU-centred 
conceptions of European legal order to treat and absorb the other legal order in its own 
terms need not lead to practical conflict or impasse, and so to the frustration or 
compromise of either set of normative purposes self-referentially conceived.25  
But if this shows the resilient importance of the CP diagnosis, the value of its                                                         
20  For discussion of the voluminous national case law, see Cruz, above n7 398-403. 
21  See e.g. Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal 
22  For discussion, see W. Sadurski, 'Solange, Chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe - 
Democracy - European Union.  (2008) 14 ELJ 1-35. 
23 See in particular in the context of German attitudes to new Treaty powers , BVerfGE 89, 155,  
Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (Maastricht Treaty);  BVerfGE 123, 267, [210] 3 
CMLR 276 (Lisbon Treaty); 
24   Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Ireland  EU-C 2012: 756  (legality of the European Stability Mechanism 
Treaty; Case C-62/14 Gauweiler, EU:C 2015:400 (answering the first preliminary reference ever made 
by the German Constitutional Court on the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary 
Transactions Programme, at BVerfG, Case No.2 BvR 2728/13, order of 7 February 2014.) 
25  See e.g. M. Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action”, in N. 
Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition, (Oxford, Hart, 2003) 501-537. 
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normative contribution remains contentious. Even if the problem it identifies is a 
genuine one that should not be avoided, its answers do not easily convince. Any of the 
potential lines of solution CP offers in the way of trans-systemic constitutional 
engagement meet with objections or reservations. A first line, known as ‘radical 
pluralism’,26 can be criticised for reverting to a kind of para-legal or even extra-legal 
realism in which pragmatic considerations of mutual dependence and survival between 
the respective systems and their judicial agents allow only a haphazard reciprocal 
accommodation. A second line, involving a so-called ‘contrapunctual’ process whereby 
there is a gradual, dialogue-enabled, blending of perspectives in a common judicial 
‘melody’ from different systemic starting points, can be criticized for deploying a 
suggestive metaphor to compensate for its normative under-specification.27  A third 
line, committed to the specification of certain umbrella principles, such as subsidiarity, 
participation, accountability and legality, shared by the different systems and allowing 
them to regulate and overcome their differences, can be criticized for its resort to a 
precariously high level of generality and abstraction as the magic formula for the 
resolution of highly specific divergences and disputes between different domain 
concerns.28  
All of these solutions, whatever their merits, are exposed to a double challenge. 
In the first place, and most immediately and obviously, there is the legal question. 
Given that these approaches continue to understand law’s authority in system-specific 
terms, the search for a solution that is legal-system-transcending yet still legal remains 
                                                        
26  See e.g., N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: OUP, 1999) ch.7; N.   Krisch ‘Who is 
Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space’ (2011) 24 
Ratio Juris 386-412    
27 Maduro n25 above. 
28  See e.g., M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State” in J. L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 258-325. 
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deeply elusive, some would say paradoxical. Either the task is avoided, as in the 
pragmatic realism of radical pluralism; or it is pursued in terms that struggle in what 
might seem a somewhat strained manner – or, even, if viewed from a less generous 
perspective, a somewhat wishful manner - to avoid the precipices of unconnected 
plurality and higher unity on either side of a fragile construction. That is to say, they 
strive, more or less persuasively, to specify new terms and dynamics of legal 
convergence that do not simply either collapse back into the dictates of divergent legal 
authorities or threaten the extinction of that very underlying divergence.  
In the second place, there remains the deeper political question. In seeking to 
address inter-systemic cleavages only in terms of actual or potential conflicts arising 
from the division and overlap of the legal competences associated with these systems, 
we are addressing symptoms rather than causes. The more profound challenge concerns 
how we might conceive of a trans-systemic ‘order’29 of constitutional authority as a 
viable prospect at all, however such an order might then proceed to deal with hard 
cases. How, if we dismiss the situated particularist’s assumption of the clear priority of 
either centre or parts, and equally, the detached particularist’s assumption of mutual 
exclusivity, can we account for the circumstances and terms in which the overlap of 
heterarchically related constitutional authorities, rather than undermining or eroding the 
legitimacy of each such authority, becomes a condition of legitimacy of the combined 
whole? 30 
(b) Holism  
                                                        
29 See Culver and Guidice, above n2. 
30 For a philosophical treatment of the idea of ‘relative authority’ under conditions of plurality and the 
requirement of mutual responsiveness as a condition of legitimacy, see Nicole Roughan, Authorities. 
Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford: OUP, 2013 
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A more radical solution to the problem of inter-systemic fault-lines, and of a trans-
systemic constitutional order more generally, is offered by the holistic method. 
Whereas particularism tries to immunize itself from the potential difficulties of inter-
systemic encounter through sticking to a system-internal approach, the holistic 
approach simply denies - or at least downgrades - the very relevance of systemic 
thinking in law. According to that approach, an elegant version of which is to be found 
in George Letsas’s neo-Dworkinian conception of ‘harmonic law’,31 we should reject 
the very premise, closely associated with the tradition of legal positivism, that law32 
comprises a system of rules predicated upon a particular socially sourced claim of 
authority. If we hold instead that law is a matter of the articulation, weighing and 
application of system-independent principles within a holistic framework of political 
morality, then the problem of legal disputes implicating conflicting argumentative 
resources at the margins of different systems dissolves – or at least recedes in 
significance. Where the deepest point of reference is always one of values and 
principles that possess a trans-systemic quality, claims of formal authority associated 
with the systemic source and location of the dispute become irrelevant or secondary. 
 The plausibility of the holistic approach, however, depends upon prescription 
and description being closely aligned. The normative emphasis on the promotion of a 
harmonizing integrity across the single cloth of law is closely bound up with a 
descriptive and explanatory claim that already understands high appellate courts as 
forums of general principle rather than guardians of particular systems, whereas the 
normative solutions mooted in the conversation between the particularists and the 
                                                        
31 G. Letsas, ‘Harmonic Law: the Case against Pluralism’ in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 77-108. 
32 understood as a general category  (‘the law’) rather than the description of a certain type of 
individuated norm (‘laws’) 
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pluralists tend to start from the opposite system-relative understanding of how the law 
presently stands. Yet just because of this requirement of close alignment, holism is an 
approach that, even if it were normatively attractive, is especially vulnerable in the 
trans-systemic context to the test of plausibility of its prior descriptive and explanatory 
account. For it remains the case that whatever may prevail, or may be possible, as 
regards normative integrity within a legal system, must be viewed less promisingly 
across legal systems.33  That is so because a legal system is not simply a matter of 
jurisdictional authority, but is also host to a particular tradition and culture of political 
morality; and it is that shared culture, reflected in and supported by the formal hierarchy 
of rules, rather than the formal hierarchy of rules alone, that accounts for law’s system-
specific coherence and the thickness of system boundaries.  What is more, even if a 
plausible case for a holistic and harmonic approach could be made between the EU’s 
many legal systems at the elite level of judicial pronouncement and exchange, just as 
is the case with the judicial-level responses offered by CP to the particularists, the 
question of underlying segmentation in the political constellation remains to be 
explored and resolved. The fact of systemic plurality and the requirement of mutual 
accommodation, to repeat, goes to the very foundations of the EU order and the 
legitimacy of its authority claim. 
3. Federalism and Pluralism 
What then of the example, and the challenge, offered to CP from federalism? We noted 
at the outset that whereas particularism and holism offer themselves in opposition to 
the major claims of CP, federalism presents itself as a superior alternative; as a 
framework sympathetic to the pluralist diagnosis of the condition of the EU but offering                                                         
33 A point Dworkin himself conceded in his late sojourn into the theory of international law; ‘A New 
Philosophy of  International Law’ (2013) 41  Philosophy and Public Affairs 2-30. 
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a better explanatory and normative model, and one with a much deeper intellectual 
heritage. What is more, unlike particularism and holism, and indeed unlike many strains 
and emphases within CP itself, federalism operates at the level of the political system 
as a whole – where, as we have argued, CP must also sound if it is to have traction as a 
serious account of the EU. 
 The basic tenets of the federal claim can be laid out quite simply. Federalism, 
broadly conceived, is ‘the genus of political organization that is marked by the 
combination of shared rule and self-rule.’34 The federal compact, then, is based upon   
the co-existence of two types of political body.  On the one hand, there are the (self-
ruling) federal members, while on the other there is the (shared) federation of common 
institutions and jurisdiction. The federal compact is entered into on a voluntary basis, 
its object to inaugurate and sustain a dual political system. Both the separate parts and 
the common part should be preserved, each speaking to a different background 
constituency or demos; the various member states and their  ‘peoples’ on the one hand, 
and the ‘people’ or citizens of the federation as a whole on the other. Importantly, both 
the preservation of the separate parts and the common part and their combination is 
guaranteed in and through a founding Constitutional Treaty, which, in keeping with the 
general purpose of any scheme of constitutional thought and practice serves symbolic, 
epistemic and design functions. First, it supplies an expression of the founding 
commitment to the new dual system. Secondly, it provides a reference point of 
collective authorship for the development of that dual system. Thirdly, it gives 
normative direction and architectural form to this duality; it does so through setting out 
a divided power regime which guarantees competences to each level, and which also 
                                                        
34 R. Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems and Federations’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political 
Science 117-37 
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supplies institutions to exercise and monitor these competences and ensure the co-
ordination of the whole in the light of these different spheres of competence. 
In the view of many commentators, the European Union can be presented as 
fitting the federal model. 35  From the very outset the compact between the Member 
States to form the Union as a whole may be understood as having supplied the 
rudiments of a dual system. It is one that has been developed and preserved through 
many Treaty iterations, from Rome to Lisbon, and, as such, that compact may be 
understood as having gradually evolved into a ‘Treaty-Constitution.’36 In particular, 
both the demarcation of competences and the institutional division and co-ordination 
of labour between state-centred bodies (Council, European Council, and, increasingly, 
national Parliaments themselves) and EU-centred bodies (European Commission and 
European Parliament) established through these Treaties operate to sustain the federal 
order.  On this view, crucially for our purposes, the Gordian knot between hierarchy 
and order is broken. The European Union is presented as a coherent legal and political 
order, but one that implies a dual rather than a unitary sourcing of authority and which 
accords no necessary priority to one site or level - state or European - over the other. 
Yet to the extent that federalism, for all its claimed fit with the unfolding 
European story, has not in fact provided a strong narrative of self-understanding of the 
EU, a challenge is posed to defenders of the federalist thesis. Can we really claim 
federalism as a convincing model for the EU when none of its key constituencies – 
citizens, member states or even its central institutions – consistently view and present 
themselves as operating within a federation, and, where, as we shall see, they may even                                                         
35 See e.g., K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse The Federal Vision (Oxford: OUP, 2002); R.  Schütze, European 
Constitutional Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) ch2; see also Baquero Cruz above n7, 408-10.  
36 Schütze, above n35, citing with approval, E. Stein, ’Towards Supremacy of Treaty –Constitution by 
Judicial Fiat on the Margins of the Costa case’ 1964-65 Michigan Law Journal 491. 
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incur significant ideological cost by asserting the ‘f’ word in public discourse? 37 
One robust answer from the federalist side seeks to turn defence into attack and 
shift the burden of proof back on to federalism’s critics. The partial failure of federal 
self-identification, so the argument runs, may be attributed to a blinkered European 
statist tradition that understands constituent power, sovereignty and constitutional 
identity in purely unitary terms.38 According to this view, the inability to conceive of 
these key ingredients of political authority other than in a singular manner has led to 
the exaggerated retention of the national/international distinction in thinking about the 
EU. The undeniable dispersal of political authority in the new European configuration, 
in other words, tends to be treated through its externalisation in accordance with an 
inside/outside divide rather than through a dualised sense of the internal. And tellingly, 
from the federalist perspective that very incapacity or unwillingness within the 
blinkered European tradition to conceptualise duality in an infra-systemic rather than 
in an inter-systemic manner provides the stick with which to chastise CP.  As a 
supposed exemplar of that blinkered tradition, CP is deemed unable to overcome the 
fractured legal and political condition of its own self-understanding.39 Armed with the 
insight that political authority has evolved along plural lines in contemporary Europe 
and seeking to avoid reducing that plurality to a single hierarchy, CP nevertheless is 
frustrated in its efforts to develop that insight in a productively ‘federal’ manner – one 
that channels and resolves conflict within the wide boundaries of a single legal and 
political order - by denying itself the very conceptual tools of graduated internal 
authority necessary to do so. 
                                                        
37  See e.g., A. Borriello and A. Crespy ‘How to not speak the F- word: Federalism between mirage and 
imperative in the euro crisis’ (2015) 54 European Journal of Political Research 502-24 
38  See in particular, Schütze, above n35, 53-59. 
39  Schütze, above  n35, 67-68 an fn114 
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How might the constitutional pluralist respond to that counter-charge? 
Crucially, this depends upon a deeper examination of the role of one item in the 
catalogue of unitary political concepts – namely the state itself - within federal political 
theory. Proponents of the federalist vision of the EU have long insisted that the 
appropriate form of federal compact for the EU is not a European federal state. And, 
indeed, it is precisely the spectre of the European federal state, viewed by most as a 
terminal betrayal of the ethic of a dual power system between member states and EU, 
that has made the ‘f’ word “taboo”40 in many European political circles. Instead, Euro-
federalists talk of a Federation of States,41 or some otherwise labeled federal union 
short of statehood. Yet while it is perfectly in keeping with the etymology of federalism 
to use it to characterise entities other than states, and so to treat it as a gradual rather 
than a categorical concept,42 we need to look more closely at what the consequences of 
adapting federalism to the non-state EU context are. And if we do so, we find that the 
supposed superiority of the federal vision as a means to characterize and to shape the 
dual power system of the EU depends to a significant extent upon just these statist or 
‘state-like’ tendencies that the Euro-federalists are at pains to deny. 
The declared advantage of the federal option over the pluralist option, as we 
have seen, involves the internalization of conflict in a manner that creates normative 
and institutional order without hierarchy, and in so doing achieves a stable, legally 
validated   equilibrium between the two levels and sources of power. But there appear 
                                                        
40 Borriello and Crespy, above n37 
41 Schütze, above n35, 79; see also at the political level, the well-known intervention by Joskcha 
Fischer, then German Foreign Minister, in his Humboldt speech of 2000, which is seen as catalyst for 
the European constitutional project of that decade. ’From Confederacy to Federation- Thoughts on 
the Finality of European Integration’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=9TXVSzSHrJ4WmfrgWXjLpLNZSnXQtGypBkh2S
2GGnD3K9MW6wybp!1615003456?docId=192161&cardId=192161 
42 See e.g. See O. Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération, (Paris: PUF, 2007);  A. Follesdal Federalism Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/ 
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to be two flaws in such an approach, one conceptual and the other practical. In the first 
place, does not the very establishment of such an order by constitutional means imply 
an authoritative foundation that would undermine the very equilibrium it seeks? If a 
European Constitutional Treaty, or Treaty-Constitution  - that is to say, a Treaty which 
assumes constitutional standing amongst all its constituent parties, and so, as a typical 
documentary Constitution, claims precedence over any other legal sources within or 
encroaching upon its jurisdiction, and is amendable, if at all, only by the constitutional 
authors acting as one constituent power (in practice, usually by special majority)  - 
comes to be understood as the measure of any new federal order, then, in accordance 
with the federalist insistence upon a foundational constitutional compact, would not 
that Constitutional Treaty become the final source of  legal authority for the EU territory 
as a whole? The system put in place might, indeed, be one of institutional diversity - a 
duality of spheres of competence, government organs and represented constituencies, 
but the authoritative foundations of the system guaranteeing and sustaining that duality 
would now themselves be dependent upon the singular authority of the Constitutional 
Treaty and its equally singular, if diversely composed constituent power. In these 
circumstances, would we not, then, revert by default to a version of EU-centred 
particularism, and so to a polity which in legal form, if not necessarily in political ethos, 
is indistinguishable from federal statehood? 
Yet this scenario, I would contend, is merely hypothetical. It does not accurately 
capture the EU’s current political state of being, and this brings us to the second, 
practical objection to the federalist approach. The only initiative in the EU’s history 
explicitly aimed at elevating its constitutional self-projection to the status of a canonical 
written constitution, namely the Convention on the Future of Europe’s draft of 2003, 
failed in part precisely because of widespread concerns across European populations 
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about the possibility of its asserting or implying just that strong federal-state-like claim 
of a governing constitutional authority for the European legal and political space as a 
whole.43  In any event, and underlining the formidable practical impediment to a federal 
settlement, even if it had been successfully ratified it is highly unlikely that the 
Constitutional Treaty would have been accorded such elevated constitutional standing. 
Rather than a constitution of the whole, the unresolved mix of polity-shaping ambitions 
motivating its initiative and drafting and the weight of residual fears about federal 
statehood44 suggest that, in the absence of any clear message in the text itself,45 the 
Constitutional Treaty would probably have come to be treated, not least by the top 
courts of the member states, as the constitution only of the higher ‘federal’ or 
supranational level. In such a scenario, the member states would retain final authority 
over their own internal constitutional order, including those elements bearing upon the 
nature and limits of the federal compact set out within the Constitutional Treaty. In 
other words, a ‘federal’ constitution, even if successfully ratified and implemented, 
would probably have been understood and interpreted in more modest constitutional 
                                                        
43 See e.g. N. Walker, ‘ The European Union’s Unresolved Constitution’ in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajo 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012)  1185-1207 
44  The polity-shaping ambitions of the supporters of the process differed widely, ranging from a 
desire to provide a platform for eventual continental federal statehood to a state-centred 
determination to set textual barriers against any further integration; see e.g., N. Walker ‘European 
Constitutional Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy’ (2005) 3 ICON 211-38. 
45 The constitutional draft did contain some provisions that, in their range and ambition, arguably 
implied the ‘constitution of the whole’. These included Art I-5, holding that ‘The union shall respect 
the equality of Member States before the constitution as well as their national identities, inherent in 
their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government’, and a detailed Article I-60 on the terms of voluntary withdrawal or ‘secession’ of 
member states. Both clauses, indeed, were subsequently inserted into an amended TEU under the 
Treaty of Lisbon (arts 4 and 50 respectively). But in many other respects, the constitutional draft read 
as a constitution only of the federal level. To take just one example, its competence catalogue sought 
to delineate the competences of the Union but not those of the Member States, despite the express 
initial ambition of the President of the Convention to pursue a comprehensive approach; see V. 
Giscard D’Estaing, ‘The Convention and the Future of Europe: Issues and Goals’ (2003) 1 ICON 346. 
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pluralist terms.  
We will return to the option of the ‘halfway house’ of an authoritative 
constitution of the federal level in our concluding sections, as it is central to any fully 
developed CP model. For now, however, let us summarize the limitations as well as the 
resilient suggestiveness of the broader federal case. It would seem that the 
constitutional adoption of a comprehensive federal order by the EU would be bound to 
replicate the very statist logic of an underpinning unity of sovereign authority that the 
Euro-federalists want to overcome. That is to say, while there is a commitment to 
respect or promote a resilient duality of jurisdictions, institutions and political sources 
in the Euro-federal model, the very grounding of that commitment in the performative 
act of a   Constitutional Treaty would signal that the deeper question of sovereignty – 
of ultimate authority - had now been resolved into an underlying singularity.46  In the 
event, however, any such robust federal prospect remains academic, as the EU in its 
present condition lacks the political support even to contemplate such a move. If these 
objections hold, it is not clear what, if any, advantages the federalist vision holds over 
constitutional pluralism in ‘ordering’ the terms of the EU’s political and normative 
                                                        
46 Schütze, above n35 61, despite his strong advocacy of a federal model, in fact resists this conclusion 
for the EU. He holds instead that the non-acceptance of absolute supremacy of European law by the 
Member States and  ‘the ambivalence surrounding supremacy and sovereignty can be viewed as part 
and parcel of Europe’s federal nature’. But if the EU sovereignty question remains unresolved in this 
way, as I also believe to be correct, then the status of any central constitutional claim must be 
considered to be that a partial or relative authority, dispositive of matters only from the perspective 
of the European people acting together supranationally and only for these matters in which they are 
acting together supranationally. In that case, a clear distinction holds precisely along the lines 
theorized by CP between the EU on the one hand and the mature federal model exemplified by the 
United States on the other, notwithstanding Schütze’s own treatment of the two as closely 
comparable. The sovereignty question, of course, was also unsettled and ‘ambivalent’ during the 
antebellum period of the new American Republic, but the Civil War and its constitutional aftermath 
resolved matters unequivocally against CP and in favour of federal statehood within a single 
overarching constitutional order. This seems a distinction worth preserving, and indeed one that 
brings into clear comparative focus the key question of whether the long-term trajectory of the EU 
will, like the USA, tend in the direction of federal statehood. Yet it is also a distinction that an 
insistence on using federal language for options on either side (of its state/non-state divide) is in 
danger of blurring and downplaying.  
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diversity; to the contrary, certain disadvantages are apparent, as the ‘f’ word seems to 
carry the perennial danger of association with a state-centred logic.  
More generally, however, regardless of the most apt label for a mature EU  - 
federalist, neo-federalist or pluralist - consideration of the arguments underlying the 
fuller federal option makes vivid what is at stake in the treatment of a resiliently divided 
power system in which a claim to constitutional authority has been developed at and 
for the common part to match that made at and for the distinct parts. And this does at 
least suggest one indirect benefit of focusing on that federal alternative. In insisting on 
the idea of a popularly endorsed founding Constitutional Treaty, the federal vision 
clearly indicates a solution that reaches down into the basic underpinnings of the 
divided power system. In so doing, it exposes the historical limitations of viewing 
constitutional pluralism as a largely elite-driven process, with the constitutional claim 
at and for the common part more a matter of the discursive reconstruction by judges 
and, more forcibly, by academic sponsors and fellow travellers, of a series of 
incremental shifts in the underlying balance of legal and political forces, than the 
conscious product of a wider political circuit of collective self-assertion, self-
recognition and self-projection.47  
And so we are left with the unanswered question of how to endow a genuinely 
pluralist constitutional order, in all its unavoidable awkwardness, with a form of 
stability that combines two features. Like the federal solution, its settlement should 
enjoy a deeper and wider endorsement across its various constituencies; yet unlike the 
federal solution, that endorsement should not be such as to undermine the order’s basic                                                         
47  A discursive process of ‘small ‘c’ constitutionalism’ that has intensified rather than receded 
following the failure of the 2003-5 process; sometimes, indeed, involving the defensive claim that the 
EU’s existing ‘small ‘c’’ acquis  has rendered a ‘big ‘C’’ process unnecessary, and  to that  extent in 
direct reaction to and compensation for that very failure; see Walker, above n43. 
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condition of duality. 
 
4.  The Age of Constitutional Pluralism 
Once upon a time that unanswered question appeared decidedly less urgent, and so lay 
largely unaddressed. There used to a pragmatic view of the EU, one with widespread 
currency, which held that ‘if it aint broke, don’t’ fix it’.48 On this view, the divided 
power system that frames the federalist and pluralist visions does not necessarily 
demand close scrutiny or intervention. If Europe’s ‘permissive consensus’49 in its early 
decades was about abundant  ‘output legitimacy’ rather than deficient ‘input 
legitimacy,’50 then the structural balance between states and EU need not be so finely 
calibrated, and the authoritative credentials of each need not be so closely monitored 
The precise terms of normative trade, and the exact pedigree of authority were matters 
that could be sidestepped or discussed in a manner free from angst about the threshold 
viability or minimal terms of co-existence of legal and political communities. The 
message of Constitutional Pluralism, in that early perspective, would have been of 
limited political resonance, as indeed were most theories of integration that sought to 
define and assess the EU in terms of its structural DNA qua polity as opposed to its 
deliverables. The kinds of problems CP would identify and address, even if not denied 
along particularist lines, overridden along holistic lines, or treated along federalist lines, 
would be viewed as only the remotest precursor of any condition that could threaten 
                                                        
48 J. Weiler, "Fischer: The Dark Side" in C. Joerges, Y. Meny and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), What Kind of 
Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer. (Florence: Robert Schuman Centre, 
2000); available on-line at: http://www.iue.it/RSC/symposium/ 
49 See e.g., L. Hooghe and G. Marx, ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from 
permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’ (2008) 39 British Journal of Political Science 1-23. 
50 See F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
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the polity as a whole.  
Only after Maastricht’s significant deepening (in EMU) and widening (across 
Three Pillars) of integration, and especially after the German Constitutional Court’s 
admonitory decision on Maastricht,51 did CP find its moment. It came of age, as it were, 
as ‘a response to the (national judicial) response’ to the polity’s growth spurt. It 
reflected and reacted to a new anxiety - a sense that there was more at stake in deciding 
and declaring the   authoritative foundations of the European polity, and that these 
foundations had become precariously balanced.52 Yet the emphasis on Courts and on 
judicial highlights also cushioned that message, encouraging the view that the problem 
remained occasional, specialist and of largely expressive significance, rather than 
endemic, general and structural. And in keeping with the sense of this being a matter 
of growing pains, the problems to which CP was a response could still plausibly be 
viewed as a passing phase, a product of circumstances; of the stepwise transformation 
brought about the ‘1992’ completion of the single market, the Maastricht Three Pillar 
reforms and Eastern Enlargement, and so likely to settle down again in due course. 
No one thinks that way any longer. If there was something complacent about 
the earlier pragmatism, we now live in a time of widespread foreboding and of 
‘despondency and lethargy’ 53  over the future of a polity which has had its basic 
legitimacy questioned as never before. The ‘capacity-expectations gap’54 exposed by 
the EU’s management of the uneven costs and benefits of the sovereign debt crisis in 
the Eurozone has undermined levels of output legitimacy already depleted by the post-
                                                        
51  BVerfGE 89, 155, Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
52 See Cruz, above n7. 
53 M. Dawson and F. De Witte ‘From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU’ (2016) 22 ELJ 
(forthcoming). 
54 C. Hill,  ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role’ (1993) 35 
JCMS 305-28 
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Maastricht extension of jurisdiction into more contentious economic, social and 
security matters, while exposing - and arguably exacerbating - longstanding problems 
of input legitimacy. In turn, this has led to an acceleration of institutional unsettlement, 
the exposure of new class and regional cleavages, and an unprecedented deepening of 
cross-national solidarity challenges.55 CP, in this altered perspective, assumes a new 
complexion. It graduates from being a relatively contained exercise in assessing and 
managing the high judicial and legal-theoretical implications of the EU’s early 
movements towards polity maturity to what, with the benefit of a longer view, might 
now be seen as a response to the inherent, unavoidable and perhaps unbearable stresses 
of its mature condition.  Most pointedly, the repetitive recent tensions between the 
German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice over the relationship between the 
untouchable core of national economic sovereignty and the powers of the Central Bank 
and other European institutions to protect the overall system of Monetary Union suggest 
a significant intensification of the kind of strategic inter-Court play of reservation and 
counter-reservation inaugurated after Maastricht, and perhaps even its end-game.56 
But if the imbalance of constitutional forces is part of the problem, their 
rebalancing must surely also figure in the solution. For if we take a step back, and return 
to CP’s explanatory and normative roots – shared with federal (broadly conceived) and 
with other closely related notions such as Union or Bund57 - in the idea of a divided 
power system responding to dual national and supranational constituencies, it is 
difficult to imagine how we might tackle the legitimacy problems of the European 
                                                        
55 See e.g., J. Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) C. 
Joerges ,  C. Offe, Europe Entrapped (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); M. Everson and  C. Joerges, 
‘Reconfiguring the  Politics-Law Relationship in the integration project through conflicts-law 
constitutionalism’ (2012) 18 ELJ 644-66 
56  See, in particular, the recent Gauweiler jurisprudence, above n24; and for extensive discussion, see 
Fabbrini (ed) above n7. 
57 See M. Avbelj, ‘Theory of European Union’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 818-836. 
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supranational constellation in the absence of a (re)settlement that is itself of 
‘constitutional’ quality and proportions.  
Why is this so? To recall, the key functions of constitutionalization are both as 
catalyst and prompt of political community - establishing a design capacity and an 
‘intelligent’ collective subject - and as trace and background expression of commitment 
to that political community. Yet the weakness of precisely these functional drivers 
carries much responsibility for the difficulties of supranational Europe. We can see this 
by reference to four fundamental problems affecting the contemporary steering of the 
EU, with each of which we can associate a particular constitutional deficit. 
In the first place, there is the problem of structural drift. At the time of the failed 
Constitutional Treaty, and its minor key replacement at Lisbon, it was assumed that the 
main constitutional design problem of the coming years would be one of stasis – of a 
blocked system lacking the means to adapt to new circumstances. In one sense, 
however, nothing could be further from the truth. The response to the crisis has been 
one of veritable constitutional ‘mutation.’ 58 The development of the conditionality 
criteria for debtor states and the more general requirements of fiscal discipline and 
detailed macro-economic monitoring under the European Semester have shifted the 
balance of power notably towards the European centre. And at the centre, as is well 
summed up in the spectre of ‘executive federalism’59, under the new structures of 
economic and monetary governance there has been a further dramatic shift in power to 
the executive organs of the European Council and Commission and away from 
European and national Parliaments. These developments, in turn, are exacerbated by 
                                                        
58  A.  Menendez,  ‘’An EU in Constitutional Mutation?’  20 ELJ (2014) 127-41; see also D. Chalmers, 
‘The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle’  (2012) 18 ELJ, 667-93 
59 Habermas, n55 above, 12. 
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the move towards a more differentiated Treaty regime, with the use of international law 
for the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact bypassing the 
normal system of EU Treaty amendment in a way that reinforces the power of initiative 
of coalitions of powerful states. The message of all these developments, the last most 
blatantly, is that, such is the latent capacity for transformation within the sprawling 
foundations of the European legal structure that the stalled Treaty system is no proof 
against the kind of fundamental change that reinforces existing divisions and creates 
new cleavages and constituencies of winners and losers within the EU.60  In other 
words, there would, indeed, a problem of blockage if we could understand the Treaty 
system as a strict framework of constitutional pedigree, but the pattern of creative 
adaptation and external supplementation of an already extensive, loosely and fitfully 
assembled constitutional acquis that we have witnessed ‘solves’ this problem precisely 
at the expense of any such an authoritative understanding of Treaty foundations.61 
Secondly, there is the epistemic problem of inadequate reflexivity. As Dawson 
and De Witte have sharply noted, there is in fact no shortage of proposals for further 
structural reform in the EU today that would serve to counter or at least to channel drift. 
These range from a further intensification of executive federalism, through an increase 
in differentiated integration and the encouragement of a multi-speed Europe, to the 
deepening of a system of responsible Parliamentary Government at the centre, with the 
Commission transformed into a fully political executive answerable to an enhanced 
European Parliament.62 The difficulty with such proposals, however, with their quite 
                                                        
60  On the ‘authoritarian liberal’ direction of these changes, see Wilkinson ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in 
the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce? (2015) 21 ELJ 313-39 61 On the reasons why the EU constitutional acquis has historically lacked a clear, constant and well-disciplined normative hierarchy, with particular reference to the diverse forces of ‘sectoral constitutionalization’, see Tuori, above n9. 
62 M. Dawson and F. De Witte, ‘Self-Determination in the Constitutional Future of the EU’ (2015) 21 
ELJ 371-83. 
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different consequences for the balance between the dual foundations of the EU, is that 
they are rarely articulated in the broader public sphere and never mutually engaged in 
a spirit of collective self-determination. They are instead put forward by limited 
constituencies as point of departure from the present impasse rather than imagined, as 
in the constitutional tradition, as a reflexive effort on the part of the constituencies 
making up the polity as a whole to (re)build a political project from first principles. 
In the third place, there is the prior problem of frustrated initiative. Even to 
contemplate such a project of collective self-determination requires a form of meta-
procedural consensus – or at least the commitment to reach such a consensus – as to 
the identity and remit of the relevant collective appropriately engaged in such a process 
of self-determination. Yet the elusiveness of such a prior consensus or basic expressive 
commitment, ironically, is symptomatic of the reasons why such an engagement is 
urgently required. What we seemed to be faced with, in short, is a ‘paradox of 
initiative.’63 Just to seek a common way of addressing the key question ‘who decides 
who decides’64 is already likely to expose disagreements amongst European publics 
and elites about which constituencies should be represented and how, which in turn 
reflects different and unreconciled philosophies and interests concerning the 
appropriate scope, sources and drivers of integration.65 More pointedly, even to dignify 
supranational ‘Europe’ as a project in need of a collective author with a collectively 
self-determining project might for some constituencies be a unwanted concession to the 
kind of entity Europe might but should not be, and so should be avoided or approached 
warily. 
                                                        
63 N. Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’  [2014] Public Law 529, 542. 
64  See M. Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?’ in M. Wind and 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds) European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) 74, 76. 
65  See e.g. Walker, above n44. 
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Fourthly and finally, we can indicate a consequential problem of speculative   
engagement. An interesting phenomenon can be observed in the contemporary 
discourse on EU reform. Increasingly, commentators seeking to overcome the problems 
of structural drift, inadequate reflexivity and frustrated initiative, talk and act ‘as if’ 
they were planning or issuing conclusions from a Constitutional Convention or a similar 
such constitution-making initiative. Dawson and De Witte’s own recent proposals for 
the internalization of political conflict within the EU, for example, are silent as to the 
form of engagement and delivery, but clearly presuppose something like a constitution-
making process and event.66 Equally, Fritz Scharpf’s suggestions as to how to reboot 
the EU on day zero after the crisis also presuppose, without quite spelling it out, that 
the crisis will have reached such a pitch that only a process of constitutional renewal 
would be capable of regenerating the polity. 67  And similarly, Jurgen Habermas’s 
conception of Europe as a refashioned ‘transnational democracy’ talks specifically 
about the development of the constitution of such an entity as a ‘thought experiment’68 
rather than as emerging from a concrete political process. 
Why such reluctance to spell out ways and means? It cannot be that the various 
authors are only interested in elaborating ideal forms and arrangements, leaving the 
political articulation and implementation of such recommended forms and 
arrangements to the exigencies of politics. The very point of thinking constitutionally 
is to imagine how we might mobilise and harness unruly forces and impose a frame on 
political thought and action. There would be something artificially restrictive, or at least 
question-begging, therefore, in treating the matter of the generative forces behind that                                                         
66 Above n53 
67  F. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash: a perspective on multilevel European democracy’ (2015) 21 ELJ 384-
405. 
68  J. Habermas, ‘Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational 
Democracy is Necessary and How it is Possible’ (2015) 21 ELJ 546-557, 554. 
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vital process of constitutional generation as outside our sphere of interest and 
contemplation. So the speculative tone and tendency to disengage from constitutional 
specifics must have particular roots.  In part the problem is certainly one of a damaged 
brand. The failure of the 2003-5 Constitutional Convention process casts a long and 
lingering shadow. But this damage, in turn, merely reflects how the utilization of an 
explicitly constitutional method in the supranational context aggravates the paradox of 
initiative referred to above.  Constitutions, as we have seen, are the canonical means by 
which a particular political community assert itself as such and engages in collective 
authorship, treating problems of structural elaboration and adjustment in an open 
process of engagement of interests and values. Yet, as our critique of the ‘federal’ 
conceit of a singular Treaty-Constitution indicates, reservations about endorsing the 
state-like associations of a nominally constitutional form and vehicle threaten to 
exacerbate rather than resolve the more general problem of finding common cause for 
a commonly engaged initiative-taking between those more or less committed to a pan-
European project.  
But this should not be a reason to throw the constitutional baby out with the 
statist bathwater. Earlier, we mentioned the ‘halfway house’ of a constitution of the 
‘federal’ or supranational level, which might have been the unscripted fate of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty if it had been successfully ratified a decade ago. Any future 
settlement of our divided power system under the banner of constitutional pluralism 
must draw from that example in a more consciously deliberated and projected fashion 
- and not merely as the compromised outcome of a fuller federal ambition - to provide 
a novel parsing of constitutional commitment, capacity and competence. On the one 
hand, as we have seen, only a constitution or its functional equivalent can provide the 
symbolic and epistemic basis for renewal of and reflection upon the system of 
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supranational governance through a process of collective authorship. On the other hand, 
any such constitutional project cannot advertise its claims and wares in such a way as 
would suggest its emulation or eclipse of the state as a form of original political 
community, thereby deterring those many who are wary of such a connection from 
offering their endorsement or involvement.  And so such a constitution must address in 
a different way the problem, central to the debate between pluralism and federalism, of 
its authoritative source and extent. 
 As Habermas has argued, the source of such a settlement would have to 
comprise the ‘double sovereign’ of European citizens and the already constituted 
peoples of the member states. 69  But if this double sovereign feeds into a single 
constituent power, the consequent fusion in a singular documentary process and 
achievement remains arguably indistinct from the founding condition and duly 
constituted authority of many federal states.70 In addition, therefore, what is needed as 
a distinguishing factor is an explicit recognition that this constitution, and its constituent 
authority, is only concerned with transnational institutions and competences, and that 
national jurisdiction over unpooled capacity remains rooted in national acts and systems 
of constitutional authority. What requires to be delivered, then, is a new kind of 
constitutional dualism, one that guards against opposite forms of slippage in order to 
track the deeper dualism of the political system. While any new constitutional 
settlement cannot be a constitution of the whole without seeming to beckon a full-blown 
federal state, unless that new settlement nevertheless succeeds in standing 
autonomously from the state constitutions within its own common sphere of 
competence, and so on an equal footing with these state constitutions, the authoritative 
                                                        
69 Ibid. 554 
70  See discussion in Section 3 above. 
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sense and commitment of its being an independent act of collective authorship by the 
European people acting together is lost. And in this way, we can finally envisage how 
the overlap of heterarchically related constitutional authorities of the common part and 
the local parts, rather than undermining or eroding the legitimacy of each such 
authority, becomes a condition of legitimacy of the combined whole. 
5. Putting Constitutional Pluralism into Practice 
But we need, in conclusion, to acknowledge and address two telling practical challenges 
to this deeper and politically engaged approach to CP. In the first place, how feasible 
would the introduction of any such scheme be? And in the second place, even if 
feasible, what, if any, real difference would re-arrangement of the constitutional 
furniture into a pluralist pattern make?   
As regards the first challenge, why should we be any more confident that we 
can overcome the paradox of initiative if we proceed along constitutional pluralist lines 
than if we seek the singular settlement favoured under the federal approach? After all, 
such is the level of disagreement over the nature and extent of the European 
supranational project, and so symbolically loaded is the ‘c’ word, the we cannot simply 
assume that the practical obstacles in the way of a CP approach, for all its careful and 
emphatic delimitation of the nature and scope of the common authority, would be less 
formidable than for any other explicitly constitutional approach. The failure of the 
earlier Constitutional Convention to negotiate the hurdles of national referendums in 
Holland and France in the face of the articulation of often inchoate nationalist fears and 
concerns about the integrationist assumptions of constitutional language is surely 
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testimony to this.71  
Yet there is another side to the argument. Giscard d’Estaing’s Constitutional 
Convention might not have succeeded, but the specifically constitutional character of 
its commitment to a European-wide political community did develop a momentum that 
surprised many EU watchers at the time. It did so, moreover, in circumstances where, 
as noted, its pluralist modesty was, at best, an inference that could be drawn from the 
text rather than an explicit commitment in self-limitation. The document provided little 
proof, therefore, against its presentation by Eurosceptical forces as the anchor of a 
federalist ‘power grab’.  What is more, the limited substantive agenda of the 
Constitutional Treaty (and its subsequent sub-constitutional re-incarnation as the 
Lisbon Treaty) meant that this ambiguous constitutional symbolism rather than any 
robust project of reform tended to dominate debate. Today, by contrast, the need to 
refashion the design principles underlying the supranational architecture has become 
much more pressing. 72  As we have seen from our discussion of the attitude of 
speculative engagement, perhaps never before have there been more root-and-branch 
reform alternatives on the table, yet a strategy and route-map to bring the relevant 
political constituencies to the table in a constitutionally committed fashion remains 
lacking. Through the explicit prospect of a settlement of the supranational level, the 
option would become available for the EU citizenry to come to the table in a fashion 
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which, unlike its predecessor initiative, make clear the pluralist and so non-hierarchical 
relationship of any new settlement to the constitutional systems of the member states. 
But even if successfully mobilised, what practical difference would a pluralist 
documentary initiative in the form of a constitution of the supranational level actually 
make?  We should not pretend that this is an easy question to answer, or that any 
constitutional initiative could make a profound difference in isolation.  Constitutional 
settlements typically operate at such a level of societal generality and, in the case of the 
more successful ones, do so over such extended time frames and in such complex 
interaction with other forces, that it is always difficult to anticipate the impact of any 
particular settlement from the immediate circumstances and terms of its enactment.73 
Yet, reverting one final time to our three basic constitutional functions, we can point to 
certain advantages. 
As already noted, the present, post-crisis blocked treaty system has highlighted 
the absence of a reflexive framework of collective commitment and planning and has 
allowed for structural drift. A new explicitly constitutional model for the supranational 
level, then, could offer epistemic and design advantages.  Not only would it allow large 
choices of institutional architecture and policy direction to be considered and 
renegotiated, it would also encourage, in accordance with a familiar constitutional logic 
of normative hierarchy, a leaner and therefore more legible and less intrusive set of 
constitutional pre-commitments. That is to say, a renewed constitutional model, in 
replacing the present sprawling mass of Treaty-level provision with a sparer model, 
could both focus on a clearer and more coherent framework of governance and avoid 
placing too many matters beyond the reach of ongoing political engagement and                                                         
73 See e.g., J. Melton, T. Ginsburg, and Z. Elkins, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2009). 
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contestation in the federal domain.74  In that way statist fears of too many matters being 
resolved beyond national influence in a top-heavy federal settlement could be assuaged 
at the same time as concerns for a more active politics of the federal level could be 
answered. 
Just as significant, however, would be the strength of the new expressive 
commitment to a dual system of political community. Dawson and De Witte have 
suggested that the most important question facing the new Europe is ‘how do we want 
to live together in this particular place on earth?’75 Yet the perspective of CP reminds 
us that each and all of our citizens has more than one ‘particular place’ and community 
of political attachment. In a ‘post-holistic’ constitutional environment, I have argued 
elsewhere, we must recognize that ‘questions of the common interest in collective 
decision-making are simply not questions that, at the deepest level of political self-
interrogation, we can envisage all…affected addressing comprehensively in 
common’.76 Rather, our collective identities, and the conceptions of common interest 
they engage, interlock rather than coincide. And so, in the European context, Dawson 
and De Witte’s ‘most important question’ is not one but three. Each citizen has to ask 
herself how to live together both nationally and supranationally, and also with regard 
to the proper boundary and terms of interaction between these two contexts of living 
together. A documentary constitution of and for the higher pan-European level, then, 
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should affirm not just the importance of that continental ‘particular place’, but also of 
the relationship of co-equality between that form of communal political life and the 
various and diverse communal political lives of the 28 member states.  
Finally, and coming full circle, we return to the judicial level at which the 
questions of CP first arose.  The new dualism of constitutional settlements, and so of 
political identities and communities, would not, of course, resolve judicial conflicts at 
the margins of the two systems. Constitutional language is simply too open-textured, 
and, as is palpable from the present state of political debate within and about the Union, 
the interests of national and supranational communities are insufficiently harmonized 
to avoid clashes. A constitution of the supranational level would, however, achieve two 
worthwhile objectives. First, the drafting of the new constitutional instrument would 
provide an opportunity to specify anew the limits of supranational jurisdiction, and so 
to reduce or at least clarify the terms of conflict with the national level from the 
supranational perspective. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it would lend 
conviction and legitimacy to judicial perspectives on both sides which, in asserting the 
constitutional authority of their own system were also prepared to acknowledge the 
equal constitutional authority of the other system.77 In the presence of a documentary 
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constitution of the supranational level, those tending towards national constitutional 
particularism would instead have to concede the indisputable institutional fact of a 
parallel supranational constitutional authority. Equally, those tending towards 
supranational constitutional particularism would, on the insistence of their own 
supporting documentary source, instead have to accept the hardness of the boundaries 
of supranational jurisdiction   and the limits of legislative kompetenz-kompetenz,78 and 
so concede the preservation of an unimpeachable domain of national constitutional self-
regulation. In this way, the very understanding that makes the attitude of mutual 
recognition and accommodation associated with CP necessary and appropriate would 
be politically validated and textually affirmed. And so, no longer the somewhat strained 
or even wishful product of a particular line of constitutional theory,79 pluralism rather 
than particularism might become the default judicial perspective on the EU order as a 
whole on either side. This, in turn, would surely encourage less defensive judicial 
dispositions across the national-supranational fault-line and the more generous 
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